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NOTES
FEDERAL COURTS-THREE-JUDGE STATUTORY COURTS UNDER
SEC. 266 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE-POWERS OF'THE SINGLE JUDGE.
-On April 6, 1942, Congress by enacting Chapter 210, Sec. 3, 56
Stat. 199, 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 792. again dealt with the powers
of single federal judges in cases falling within the provisions of
Sec. 266 of the judicial code." Sec. 266 requires the presence of
three federal judges, one of whom must be a circuit judge, in equity
suits where an interlocutory injunction is sought on constitutional
grounds in the federal district courts to restrain state officials from
enforcing a state statute or order of a state administrative tribunal.-
The powers of a single district judge in cases falling within the
section have presented a troublesome question. Prior to the case
of Ex parte Poresky, although it was well settled that a single
judge could not dismiss such a case on the merits, there was no
decision covering the matter of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.'
In that case the Supreme Court declared that the smgle, judge
'Judicial Code, Sec. 266, as amended, 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 380.2See: Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required? 16 Mixxt-
soYA LAw REvIEW 1. See also 18 M. L. R. 729; 19 V.. L. R. 92.
3Ex parte Poresky (1933) 290 U. S. 301, 54 S. Ct. 3, 78 L. Ed. 152, 18
M. L. R. 729.4 1t had been suggested on principle that tie single judge could not dis-
miss any more for lack of jurisdiction than on the merits; 16 M. L. R. 1,
23-24.
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might dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In a subsequent decision,
California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding," the Supreme
Court went a step further to hold that it was the "duty" of the
single district judge to scrutinize the bill of' complaint and to
ascertain whether a substantial federal question is presented.
These declarations of the Supreme Court, however, would
seem now to have been overruled by Congress in the Act of 1942,
amending 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 792. That section covers all sitta-
tions where statutory three-judge courts are required and defines
in detail the powers and limitations on single judges. Briefly sunt-
marized, the single judge is authorized to take specified action"
subject, however, to review by the statutory court when later
convened. Other language in the section expressly forbids the
single judge from doing other things, among which is, to disniss
the suit.
The limitation against dismissal is not qualified' and literally
prevents a single judge dismissing the suit regardless of the
grounds, whether on the merits, or for want of a substantial federal
question as defined and sustained by the Supreme Court, or for
lack of good faith.
It may well be that in practice and by judicial construction the
new law will be so shaped as to permit a single judge to dismiss
three-judge cases in instances of clear fraud, oppression, or abuse
of process. In view of the clear language of the statute, it appears
unlikely that single judges will undertake to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds.
Alfred W. Bowen.
5(1938) 304 U. S. 252, 254, 58 S. Ct. 865, 866, 82 L. Ed. 1323.
GThe full text of the section, 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 792, follows Three-
judge district court actions for interlocutory injunction and final hearing;
powers of single judge.
In any action in a district court wherein the action of three judges is
required for the hearing and determination of an application for interlocutory
injunction and for the final hearing by reason of the provisions of sections
47, 380, or 380a of this title, or section 28 of Title 15 and section 44 of Title
49, as amended by section 1 of the Act of April 6, 1942, chapter 210, any
one of such three judges may perform all functions, conduct all proceedings.
except the trial of such action, and enter all orders required or permitted
by the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
in effect at the time, provided such single judge shall not appoint, or order
a reference to a master, or hear and determine any application for, or va-
cation of, an interlocutory injunction, or dismiss the action, or enter a suln-
mary or final judgment on all or any part of the action. Provided, how-
ever, that any action of a single judge hereby permitted shall be subject
to review at any time prior to final hearing by the court as constituted for
final hearing, on application of any party or by order of such court on its
own motion. April 6, 1942, c. 210, Sec. 3, 56 Stat. 199.
7See footnote 6, supra.
